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ANTITRUST POLICY IN DISTRIBUTION
James A. Rabi f
The entire Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
To Study the Antitrust Laws rests on the basic premise that "the general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in open
markets." I Our collection of laws relating to distribution, however,
suffer from two major ills-a confusion of the free competition ideal
with other goals and a profusion of doctrinal uncertainties which
greatly complicate the theoretical confusion. The Distribution Chapter
of the Report is an exceptionally well-written blueprint for the more intelligent application of existing laws and constitutes a major achievement in an area which has robbed the most patient experts of their
composure. It falls a little short of being a thoroughgoing treatment
of policy, however, because it does not fully explore the deep conflict
in underlying aims which vie for command of this field.
The following comments will be addressed first to a general view
of the area in order to clarify what the Committee did on the "policy"
level and what it did not do. Some of the more important detailed
recommendations will then be discussed.
Any criticism of the Report which happens to emerge here must
be presumed to be self-criticism, for the writer subscribed to a large
measure of what was done in the Distribution Chapter. As an individual, he perhaps may not be blamed for wishing that the Committee
had found it possible to do more.
OUR PRESENT DISTRIBUTION "POLICY"

There is, of course, no integrated law for distribution; all that
we have is a collection of statutory provisions which in widely varying
ways affect distribution activities. The Committee selected four main
subjects for this classification: Refusals To Deal, Exclusive Dealing,
Resale-Price Maintenance and "Fair Trade," and Price Discrimination. It could go without saying that this is not all there is to antitrust
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application to buyer-seller relations, but it is a satisfactory grouping
of the most obvious statutory provisions and concepts.2
If having a lot of law means having a policy, distribution is wellprovided for. The Distribution Chapter is the longest chapter in the
whole Report, constituting almost one-fourth of the entire discussion.
This fact is of more than statistical interest, for it demonstrates the
fashion in which legal controls oriented around distribution activity
have tended to command primary antitrust attention in recent years.
This raises the further question of how much legal control we can have
and still operate distribution on the free competition theory.
All of the laws with which we are concerned here have been legislatively promulgated in the name of protecting competition, yet unquestionably the pattern of legislation has actually produced a shift
away from "free" competition. Prior to the 1930's, antitrust law was
used to enforce free, individual decision-making in distribution and
to encourage the development of new techniques. The Sherman and
Federal Trade Commission Acts were applied to crush price-fixing,
Deliberate
resale-price maintenance and allocation of customers.'
efforts to monopolize distributive channels were attacked, 4 and direct
warfare by combinations of dealers seeking to stifle new methods were
prosecuted.- Price discrimination was regarded as an evil only in
respect of its occasional use as a predatory weapon,' and competitively
induced price differentials were freely allowed and, on occasion, positively encouraged in the name of competitive flexibility.7 The era
doubtless witnessed many violations of law which went unpunished
as enforcement vigilance occasionally languished, but in general, "free
competition" among dealers and "sturdy bargaining" 8 between dealers
and suppliers certainly had the upper hand.
2. Monopolization of the buying or selling side of a market may have more
drastic effects upon the course of distribution in that market than all of the above
practices combined. A price-fixing conspiracy or an allocation of customers will
have direct and powerful distribution consequences. See REPoRT c. 1. Vertical integration from source of supply forward toward the consumer constitutes a major
form of distribution itself. See REPORT c. 3. Other obvious distribution topics
include exclusive territorial dealerships, REPORT at 27-29, and patent license restrictions on purchasers. REPoRT at 240-41.
3. E.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (pricefixing); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(resale price maintenance) ; United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (allocation of customers).
4. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
5. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600

(1914).
6. See REPORT at 155, 160.
7. See Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); REPoRT
at 21.
8. The phrase is the Supreme Court's, in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346
U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
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But the Great Depression was too much for the ideal, and the
chain store movement compounded the depression fear that free competition was not a very good thing. With the taste of NRA still
fresh, Congress was induced to author a drastic alteration in national
policy for distributors, and the Robinson-Patman Act 10 and MillerTydings Amendment 1 1 were a dramatic shift from the pre-depression
ideal. Cut broadly from the same cloth, both laws in different ways
were designed directly to curb the growth of integrated and mass distributors and indirectly to mitigate ". . . the business hazards of ag. " ' Economic freedom for distributors
gressive competition.

thus gave ground to security, while at the same time government policy
sought to restore free competition as the primary policy for manufacturers.
"Fair trade," legalized by the Miller-Tydings Amendment, marks
the outer boundary of the departure from free competition.'3 Under
it, dealer price competition in a branded article may be totally suppressed in the name of "fairness," if the brand proprietor and a single
dealer in each state agree, and the cumulative effect of a series of
such agreements for competing commodities may immunize a large
portion of a dealer's stock in trade from ordinary competition. The
system, however, is permissive, and as yet only a minority of commodities have come under its cloak. 4
The Robinson-Patman approach is less rigid, but unlike "fair
trade," it governs the pricing of all entrepreneurs who distribute commodities in interstate commerce. Although there are qualifications,
the upshot of its approach is to make all price differences between
purchasers perilous. Though it talks in terms of protecting competition from injury, its real spirit is also "fairness"-that is, "equality
of opportunity" for all dealers. Since it appeals to one's sense of fair
play in its opposition to what it calls "discrimination," it is hard to
argue against even in the name of free enterprise. Yet its curtailment of elementary economic freedom may be plainly seen in operation.'" It seeks to prevent buyers from bargaining for price advantage
9.

REPORT at

129. See FTC,

FINAL REPORT ON THE CHAIN STORE INVESTIGATION

(1934).
10.49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
11. 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
12. REPORT at 129.
13. See FTC, REPORT ON RESALE PaICE MAINTENANCE (1945) ; GRETHER, PRICE
CONTROL UNDER FAin TRADE LEGISLATION (1939) ; Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance,

21 U. CHL L. REV. 175 (1954).
14. See FTC, REPoRr ON RESALE

PRICE MAINTENANCE

(1945).

15. There is a staggering amount of literature on the act and its consequences.
See, among others, addresses by Levi, O'Brien & Austin, in Symposium, The Robinson-
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and from obtaining compensation for efficiencies; " its primary purpose was to penalize integrated buyers. To implement this primary
aim, it seeks to prevent sellers from yielding to bargaining and from
competing freely in price by making it legally inadvisable for a seller
to reduce his price to individual buyers to whatever point is necessary
to obtain business.17 Ironically, the act has not succeeded in its primary
goal; integrated distributors have thrived. But it has enjoyed marked
success in what was only its secondary aim-it has gone far to eliminate price competition among sellers.
It is not suggested that the result has been to destroy free enterprise for sellers and buyers, or that legal control of distribution is
comprehensive. Insofar as antitrust law is concerned, people are still
free to enter or leave business, to decide what commodities shall be
bought and sold, and to select suppliers and customers. These are
basic freedoms. But freedom to bargain and to price are the translation of these basic freedoms into competitive action. By moving price
freedom from the market-place to the courthouse, the new laws tend
to deprive competition of its most valuable instrumentality and the
economy of its "central nervous system." IS
It must be concluded that our "antitrust policy for distribution"
is an enigmatic mixture of pro- and anti-competitive measures. Superficially, this is not necessarily bad policy, for American trade regulation has traditionally embraced the rationale that prohibition of reprehensibly "unfair" methods of competition is quite consistent with
protection of free competition, much as laws on defamation are consistent with free speech. And even if a fully satisfactory rationale were
not forthcoming, in antitrust--of all things-we have learned by now
not to look for perfect symmetry.
60 et seq. (1952); CouNCIL OF ECONOmIC ADVISERS ANN. REP. 15 (1948): The act

"prohibits price-making policies previously accepted as legitimate features of hard
rivalry for business . . ."; see Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust

Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1334 (1948); Oppenheim, FederalAntitrust Legislation:
Guideposts to a Revised Antitrust Policy, 50 MicH. L. REV. 1139, 1200 (1952);
Rowe, Price Discrimination,Competition and Confusion: Another Look at RobinsonPatman, 60 YAL L.J. 929 (1951); Comment, The "Injury" Requirement of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. Ray. 197 (1954).
16. Adelman, The Consistency of ttw Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN. L. REV.
3 (1953): ". . . the Act permits price discrimination against the buyer who is
served at lower cost. . . . But in practice, . . . the Act not only permits but in

fact requires such discrimination." Id. at 8.
17. Id. at 14-20. Levi, in Symposium, The Robinson-Patman Act-Is It in the
Public Interest?, A.B.A. SECTION oF ANTITRUsT LAW 60 (1952). See the fundamental objection to the act made by Hale & Hale, Monopoly in Motion: Dynamic
Economics in Antitrust Enforcement, 41 VA. L. Rlv. 431 (1955): ". . . price
discrimination may be an important means of fostering economic progress. As a
result, dynamic economic theory furnishes additional reasons for the repeal of the
Robinson-Patman Act." Id. at 472-73.
18. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
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There is, however, something more than lack of symmetry in a
"policy" which guarantees competitive freedom in most of its forms
but seeks to halt it at the threshhold of its material realization, and
there is downright frightening mystery in a "policy" which, at the
same time, (1) attaches criminal penalties to price fixing; (2) exempts
a very common form of price fixing; and (3) legislates against price
competition. The American distribution system in operation has performed miracles in bringing the products of industry to the consumer.
The magnitude of these accomplishments can hardly be appreciated
without examining the legal structure within which they have been
achieved.
THE COMMITTEE'S APPROACH

The enormous inconsistencies in this collection of distribution laws
were of course obvious to the Committee. At the outset, the chapter
observes that

".

.

. statutes woven from such diverse historical fabric

soon revealed incongruities." 19 No time is wasted in identifying the
sources of incongruity; the "fair trade" exemptions have "provoked
discord" and "most conspicuous .

.

. are the collisions between the

Robinson-Patman Act and the philosophy underlying the Sherman and
Clayton Acts." 19,a The Report quotes the Supreme Court's warning
that the Robinson-Patman Act may foster "price uniformity and
rigidity in open conflict with the purposes of other antitrust legislation" and notes the same Court's observation of the difficulty in reconciling that Act's "economic theory" with that of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts. 0
The Report does not halt with these expressions of difficulty but
lays down categorically the basic standard which it believes should
govern antitrust law for distribution. Consistent with the theme of
the whole Report, this is that doubts should be resolved ". . . in
favor of the Sherman Act's basic antitrust directives. . . . We agree

that the 'heart of our national economic policy has long been faith in the
value of competition.' "21
An over-all tally of the Committee's recommendations plainly
shows that it believed that we have had a little too much distribution
law for the good of the competitive policy, although the Committee
did not express itself in such quantitative terms. It is, in fact, exceedingly dangerous to talk this way, since critics of the Committee
19 REPoRT at 130.

19a. Id. at 131.
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 131-32.
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charge that avowal of belief in the Sherman Act while asserting that
the new laws are inconsistent with that act is a current "divide and
conquer" strategy designed to get rid of the new laws with confidence
that the old will not be strictly enforced.' But whether the Sherman
Act is strictly enforced or not (and the Report certainly emphasizes
that it should be), it does not follow that disappearance of "fair trade"
and Robinson-Patman would mean less antitrust law. It would instead
mean more, if the basic goal of antitrust is really "promotion of competition in open markets."
Although the Committee's recommendations undoubtedly all stem
from the general free competition thesis, they are not fully grounded in
a detailed elaboration of that thesis, and this is the point at which some
difficulty arises. The Report does not undertake any examination of
the actual operation of existing laws and of their market effects. This
it could not do because the Committee was not constituted as an investigative or fact-finding body. Yet final judgment on these laws
should come in the context of careful, objective appraisal of their real
impact. This lack of a factual investigation put the Committee in the
uncomfortable position of having to pass judgment on a largely theoretical basis underpinned by the practical experience of its members.
The Committee understandably hesitated to carry its theoretical premises to too many logical conclusions without the support of empirical
data, and this seems to have resulted in the suppression of some theoretical observations that might have been made and in the failure of
some of the conclusions to come out where the major premises would
dictate.
Consequently, in the treatment of the four different areas of distribution law, widely varying stages of evaluation are reached. On
the subject of refusals to deal, the Committee had no difficulty in pronouncing the present legal situation to be entirely consistent with basic
antitrust aims; it was treating here an elementary and integral subject
of Sherman Act coverage, uncomplicated with subsequent legislative
encrustation. In exclusive dealing, however, the Committee was confronted with a special enactment of ancient antitrust origin but beset
with ambiguities and current controversy. Though the Committee
accepts section 3 of the Clayton Act with tacit approval, it does not
22. See testimony of Rep. Patman in Hearings before the Antitrust Subcomnmittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (transcript
1955) ; cf. the statement of Professor Schwartz in his dissent: "If the Majority
had made realistic proposals for decartelizing the American economy, I could readily
have agreed to retreat in price discrimination. But when they combine a status
quo position on Bigness with an attack on the Robinson-Patman Act, I see only a
stengthening of the power of the already-powerful."
The Schwartz Dissent, 1
ANTTRusT BuLL. 37, 59 (1955).
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explore either its merits or its faults, and we have no Committee expression on why exclusive dealing should continue to rate specialized
legislative attention. In contrast, the Report's treatment of "fair
trade" is entirely in terms of what ought or ought not to be, and no
attention is paid to doctrinal problems of existing law. Evaluation was
easy here; "fair trade" is a very uncomplicated matter-it is simply
out-and-out direct price-fixing, and the Committee's basic premises
left no room for any other conclusion than outright repeal.
But with respect to the Robinson-Patman Act, although the
chapter's opening points to "collisions," "incongruities" and potentially irreconcilable "economic theory," I the hinted promise to evaluate
is not performed and the discussion contains not a word for, nor a
word against, the act. Robinson-Patman is simply accepted as if it
were inevitable. Yet had the Committee followed its major premises
to the bitter end, it must have come at least to the threshhold of a
recommendation for repeal, for like "fair trade," the anti-price discrimination act is basically designed to deter price competition, although
unlike "fair trade," it is a very complicated matter.
This is not to say that the Report does not seek an adjustment
between the act and the basic goals of antitrust, for the Committee
proceeds throughout its interpretation of the act with the Automatic
Canteen formula that construction of the act must be "reconciled" with
"broader antitrust policies." ' But retaining the act's inherent structure (and the Committee makes no recommendations for major overhaul), and given the enduring "faith in the value of competition,"
is it not possible that the Committee sought to reconcile the irreconcilable?
It may be suggested that if reconciliation is possible, it must be
on other premises. The Robinson-Patman Act, despite the selfish and
negative circumstances of its birth, has acquired some powerful intellectual support which is not at all countered by recital of the virtues
of free competition. One contention is that price differentiation, though
the product of the exercise of freedom by the seller, is not a valuable
form of price competition.2 6 The Report, it must be noted, contains
no discussion of the competitive advantages or disadvantages of legal
price discrimination, though the Economic Chapter of the Report con23. REPORT at 130-31.
24. Cf. Austern, Tabula in. Naufragio--Adminisrative Style; Some Observations
on the Robinson-Patman Act, CCH ANTITRUST LAw SYmposium 105 (1953):

". . . so far as I am aware no legal commentator over the past sixteen years . . .
has advocated the outright repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act." Id. at 106.
25. REPORT at 132; Automatic Canteen Co, v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 63, 73-74
(1953).
26. See comment by Professor Kahn.

RmoRT at 185-86.
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tains a good commentary on the quite different economic price discrimination which the act compels rather than deters.17 Another contention admits that the act squelches some price competition, but urges
that this is an essential regulation of concentrated industrial sellers
because the latter have achieved semi-monopolistic positions through
failure to enforce the Sherman Act. 28 This is an unmistakable "public
utility" rationale which, of course, the Committee could not accept because of its belief that the antitrust laws have maintained a "healthy
process of growth" and have been one of the "most important" factors
in "our creative American economy." 29
A final and appealing contention is that, whatever good the antitrust approach may have accomplished economically, it has fallen short
of promoting the most desirable social and political goals. It has seemed
to make a sacrificial lamb of the small, independent merchant, and the
threatened extinction of these symbols of social individuality and political independence poses a problem of far greater importance than
the extinction of price competition. 0 Robinson-Patman helps keep
small businessmen in business by relieving them of some of the worst
risks of competition, and this may be bad economics but it is arguably
good policy.
The Committee's recommendations for modified interpretation
of the Robinson-Patman Act have been violently attacked as a sly
maneuver to scuttle the statute by indirection3 1 This is not only unfair
to the committee members, but it entirely misconceives what was done,
27. Id. at 333-36.
28. Dissent by Professor Schwartz: "The Robinson-Patman Act is an unhappy
necessity. It tends to encourage price rigidity inconsistent with Sherman Act
objectives; but on the other hand it curbs the power of corporate giants who would
otherwise be relatively free to undermine their own smaller competitors by price
discrimination, or to raise havoc with competition among their customers. So long
as we permit unregulated industry to amalgamate into units of monopolistic power,
it will be necessary to restrain their freedom in pricing, just as Sections 2, 3 and
4 of the Interstate Commerce Act are required to prevent discriminatory practices
by railroads which enjoy legal protection from competition." The Schwartz Dissent,
1 ANTITRTST BuIL. 37, 59 (1955). See also dissent by Professor Adams. RmoRT
at 185. Chairman Celler, of the Antitrust Subcommittee observed: "In principle . . .
it is putting a crutch under certain activities. In principle, it does violate the concept,
the general broad concept of antitrust law, but I think it is necessary." Hearings,
sopra note 22, at 1510 (transcript).
29. REPORT at 2-3.

30. See dissent by Mr. Montague.

REPORT

at 220.

Cf. the comment of judge

Learned Hand on the purposes of the Sherman Act itself: ".

.

. [Congress] was not

necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect
social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for
his success upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of
those engaged must accept the direction of a few." United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
31. See testimony of various witnesses before Antitrust Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee in May, June and July, 1955, especially that of Senator
Kefauver, Hearings, supra note 22, at 33 et seq. (transcript); Senator Sparkman,
id. at 140 et seq. (transcript) ; Rep. Patman, id. at 100 et seq. (transcript).
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for the Committee left the basic structure of the act unimpaired. Had
the Committee wished to gut the statute, it would have said so; it had
no hesitancy in saying so on the equally explosive issue of "fair trade."
The Committee's failure to account for the non-competitive goals of
the act and its discussion entirely in terms of the competitive philosophy, however, quite naturally have misfired somewhat with both the
ardent supporters and the hard-headed critics of the act. It is the
writer's guess that the single-minded competitive overlay of the chapter
really conceals something of a belief in the need for legislative balance
between big industry and dispersed dealers, and for some form of protection for small businessmen from economic life's hazards. It might
have been a greater contribution to policy analysis, if not to solution, if
the Committee had brought some of these divergent aims to the surface.
This could have led to a recommendation for repeal of RobinsonPatman, coupled with suggestions for a program which would give aid
to small business without boring a hole through the heart of antitrust.
That the Committee did not do this is perfectly understandable.
That it must somehow be done before our "antitrust policy in distribution" will become fully understandable seems evident.
The following commentary on the Report's detailed recommendations does not purport to be comprehensive; the chapter is almost 100
pages long. An effort is simply made to highlight the more significant proposals and to invite attention to a few problems of policy
which were not considered.
REFUSALS

To DEAL

The law on refusals to deal has developed a sharp dichotomy. A
refusal by an individual not acting in concert with others is "generally
safe from antitrust." 32 It is not within section 1 of the Sherman
Act because it lacks the required element of joint action, although it
may fall under section 2 when used as an instrumentality of monopolization. In contrast, combinations to boycott or coerce have uniformly
been condemned under section 1 and are often characterized as per se
offenses.' External coercion by a combination is as abhorrent to antitrust policy as is conspiratorial self-restraint such as price-fixing;
the concept of "restraint of trade" encompasses both.
There are difficulties in managing such an extensive concept, however. A mere self-restraint such as price-fixing would normally be
meaningless without combination. But an individual refusal to deal
32. REPORT at 134.
33. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953);
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948).
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may be as harmful as a combination boycott; it all depends upon the
power of the person or persons applying the coercion. Consequently,
it is difficult to explain why combination should make such an important doctrinal difference, and there will always be pressure to extend
coverage to those individual refusals which fail to qualify as section
2 violations but which nevertheless cause harm of a sort with which
antitrust policy is concerned. One manifestation of this pressure has
been in the erection of the artificial "intra-enterprise" conspiracy doctrine to get at the coercive acts of single enterprises which happen to
have multi-corporate form." By and large, however, such pressure
has been resisted not only because of the conspiracy requirement but
because of the principle that an individual's right to select those with
whom he will deal is an elementary right which should not be lightly
infringed.'
Only a moment's reflection is required to demonstrate
that neither economic freedom nor competition could survive a rule
requiring traders to deal with all comers38
The Committee strongly endorses the law's condemnation of combination boycotts and equally strongly approves the law's protection
of the individual privilege. At the same time, the Committee painstakingly catalogues the qualifications which warn that mere assertion
of the individual privilege will not immunize conduct which is an integral part of a larger and independent violation of law. The resulting
balance of privilege and qualification is termed ".

.

. an appropriate

balance between preserving the individual's freedom to deal and the protection from undue trade restraints." 17 Here organic antitrust law has
functioned well in handling an extremely delicate matter without unduly
abusing essential freedom or neglecting public protection, and this
is the genius of antitrust at its best.
There may be a moral in this. Individual refusals may cause
great harm to individual businessmen and may seriously affect the
ability of some to keep pace with rivals. In the name of "equality of
34. See REIoPT at 30-36 for discussion of the doctrine of "intra-enterprise" con-

spiracy. The Committee majority approves use of the doctrine where corporate
families coerce or unreasonably restrain outsiders, but disapproves its use in instances
of mere self-limitation within the family, thus offering a distinction which has been
consistently rejected in cases of true individual refusals to deal. The Report does
not explain how this distinction can be satisfactorily administered.
35. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act
does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as
to parties with whom he will deal. . . ." United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919). See also FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924).
36. See Barber, Refuals To Deal Under the Federal Ant-tru,irt Laws, 103 U.
PA. L. REv. 847 (1955): "A refusal to deal, like the making of a contract, is in
itself an ordinary commercial act."
37. REPoRaT at 137.

1955]

ANTITRUST POLICY IN DISTRIBUTION

opportunity," an appealing case could be made for some sort of requirement of "nondiscriminatory" dealing. What would be the harm in
passing a "fair dealing" law on the Clayton Act model, making refusals
unlawful "where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition"? Such a law, it could be argued, would spread business opportunity and security while comporting with antitrust policy through the
"effect" test. Only "incipient" trade restraints would be nipped; other
refusals would be vindicated upon failure to show the requisite effect,
or upon demonstration of some affirmative justification such as undue
costs, bad credit or impossibility.
The obvious vice in singling out individual refusals for special
legislative treatment would be that the very act of singling them out
would make them, all at once, legally suspect. No amount of qualification with tests of "reasonable probability of adverse effect on competition" would alter the fact that emphasis would shift from an atmosphere of freedom to one of suspicion and regulated dealing; and a
change in emphasis is all that is needed to destroy a "balance" which
the Committee finds to have been nicely achieved. (Yet this is precisely the approach which has been adopted for price discrimination and
for exclusive dealing.)
To return to present law, there are of course some doctrinal
problems. One is that, while everyone abhors a boycott, easy definitions of what a boycott is have not been forthcoming. The Report
usually speaks of "group action to coerce" or uses similar language
meaning action taken to force unwanted changes in the outsider's business policies or conduct.38 This meaning does not account for all forms
of "combined refusal to deal" by any means. Traders may agree
among themselves to deal in a certain way or on certain terms, i.e.,
not to deal except on those terms, without intending to force outsiders
into an unfavorable change of position. Intention to harm or to coerce
is absent, but combined refusal to deal may be present. One author
has recently drawn a sharp distinction between coercive refusals and
those involving mere limitations upon the freedom of group members,
with the observation that the latter kind of concerted refusal should not
at all necessarily be regarded as unlawful.8 9 As he points out, the
Fashion Guild case o was a real coercion case, but the Supreme Court
in the Associated Press case,4 1 which was merely a self-limitation case,
seemingly obliterated any such distinction, and dicta in other cases
38. Id. at 133, 137.
39. Barber, supra note 36, at 876.
40. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); see Barber, supra

note 36, at 874.
41. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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have served further to suggest that any group refusal to deal, whatever
If this loose
its purpose or primary impact, is per se unreasonable.'
approach were carried to a logical end, it would tend to engulf almost
all section 1 combination cases, since most internal or self-limitation
combinations contain the implication of refusal to do business except
on the agreed terms. The Report does not discuss this problem of
definition, although it intuitively leaves room for some flexibility by
avoiding the outright characterization of group refusals as per se
offenses.
A related problem of definition involves cases which are on the
frontiers of antitrust coverage. The boycott rule is, of course, concerned with commercial affairs, but the line of demarcation between
non-commercial goals outside the Sherman Act and those within is
very fuzzy, as a comparison of the Apex Hosiery,' Allen-Bradley44
and American Medical Association ' opinions will demonstrate. The
Report is not especially helpful with respect to the question of how
far the boycott rule (and the Sherman Act itself) will reach.
The Report is perhaps a little vague with regard to the important
matter of application of the Federal Trade Commission Act to individual refusals, and this is characteristic of the entire Report's failure
to spell out a general theory for antitrust application of that act. Until
of late, the Commission seemed largely to confine itself to importation
of Sherman and Clayton Act doctrine, but recent cases have underscored the fact that the Federal Trade Commission Act contains no
such limitation.4" A misguided commission decision could readily
undermine the nice balance now existing.
EXCLUSIVE DEALING

The chapter's treatment of exclusive dealing is largely confined
to discussion of section 3 of the Clayton Act. Fashioned in legislative compromise and born of the fear that the Sherman Act was in42. See note 33 supra.
43. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) (sit-down strike not restraint of trade within Sherman Act).
44. Allen-Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, AFL, 325 U.S. 797 (1945) (union-management combination within Sherman
Act).
45. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943) (coercion
of group health organization by medical organization within Sherman Act; question
left open as to applicability of act to medical practice itself); cf. RP.,oRT at 62-63.
46. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
"It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act . . . to stop in their incipiency
acts and practices, which, when full-blown, would violate those acts. . .

."

Id. at

394-95. See also FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 691 (1948); Triangle
Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948).
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capable of coping with dangerous tying practices, section 3 is now over
40 years old.47 It is interesting to note that it has become such a part
of our habits of antitrust thought that there is no inclination to question its continued necessity or desirability; the Committee takes the
section for granted and concerns itself only with interpretation.
That section 3 is no longer vitally necessary would seem beyond
question in view of the ready applicability of both the Sherman and
Federal Trade Commission Acts to exclusive dealing practices.4 It
may nevertheless have some special kind of value, and a direct discussion of this might have contributed something to our understanding of
antitrust technique. The Committee can hardly be blamed for not
doing this, of course, for even the most polite questioning of this ancient
and honorable antitrust appendage would quickly have been misinterpreted.
Section 3 does two things that are special. One, it singles a particular type of practice out of the multitude of commercial methods
and makes it legally suspect. Two, it qualifies illegality with a unique
test of ascertaining what the "effect may be"-that is, it asks whether
injury to competition is "reasonably probable." " The value in singling out exclusive dealing is historically demonstrable, but presently
questionable. A catalogue of the practices which have posed the danger
of restraint of trade or monopoly would run many pages. Refusals
to deal, price-fixing and the other per se Sherman Act sins, patent
abuses, selling below cost and a host of predatory or unfair competitive
methods have turned up in the campaign platform of the monopolist
as often as exclusive dealing and tying arrangements.
But it can be replied that there is no harm done and undoubtedly
some good in special treatment of a practice which is admittedly potentially dangerous. This is doubtless a good practical answer, and it
may be said that the "effect" test keeps the treatment geared to antitrust standards, so that we have simply moved from the general to the
specific without any real change in direction. The danger in this
47. For discussion of legislative history and policy, see McAllister, Where the
Effect May Be To Substantially Lessen Competition or Tend To Create a Monopoly,
A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 124 (1953); Schwartz, Potential Impairment of
Competition--The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States on the
Standard of Legality under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10 (1949); McLaren,
Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts and Acquisitions in Vertical Integration under the Antitrust Laws, 45 I.. L. REv. 141 (1950); Lockhart & Sacks,
The Relevance of Econonic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HIv. L. R1v. 913 (1952).
48. See FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953)
(FTC Act) ; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (Sherman
Act).
49. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 357
(1922).
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reasoning is that it tends to promote the assumption that specific legal
controls can be accommodated to antitrust aims merely by leaving
room for an inquiry into competitive effect. The outstanding example
of the intellectual confusion and the antitrust damage which extension of this idea can produce is the Robinson-Patman Act, where
much price competition is made illegal on the ground that it injures
competition. Section 3 has probably promoted more competition than
it has injured, but as an antitrust technique, it should be kept under
close scrutiny.
There is more to the technique. Section 3 does not attempt a
mere specification of Sherman Act doctrine, but is supposed to act as
an advance patrol to catch competitive damage in its "incipiency" without waiting for a Sherman Act engagement to develop. Irrespective
of the high merit in what portions of the Clayton Act have accomplished, this test of "where the effect may be .

.

."

must certainly

rank as one of the legislative curiosities of all time. Its inscrutable
meaning has delivered up diametically opposite Supreme Court interpretations. o There is persistent confusion as to whether it merely
prescribes a different standard of proof or whether it prescribes a different substantive standard."' And whichever it is, there must always
be some question as to the propriety of an antitrust statute which condemns conduct which only "may be" offensive to the public interest.
Deeply imbedded in the "incipiency" concept of course is the sound
idea of preventive action; only the short-sighted wait for smallpox
to appear before calling the doctor when a vaccine can be had. But a
vaccine stops nothing that is useful. Some exclusive dealing arrangements are not only useful but under the right circumstances are positively beneficial to competition, as both the Committee majority and
the dissenters would apparently agree." These, nevertheless, are all
placed under a cloud of legal suspicion. How much harm is done
no one can say. The harm becomes plain, however, when the courts
in the face of the administrative tortures involved in qualitatively applying the test yield to the almost irresistible temptation to reduce it
50. Compare Standard
(1922), oith Standard Oil
and International Salt Co.
51. Compare Adelman,

Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346
Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949),
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
Acquire the Whole or Any Part of the Stock or Assets

of Another Corporation, A.B.A. SEcToN oF ANTITRUST LAW

111,

118 (1953)

(". . . the essential difference seems to me simply that the Clayton Act requires
a lower standard of proof of the same kind of facts"), with REPoRT at 147-48 ("The
law was clearly intended to strike before real injury was done.");
52. See REIoa-r at 145: ". . . exclusive arrangements may in fact promote
vigorous competition and need not signal coercive market power in the seller."
Professor Schwartz and others would apparently resort to a strict condemnation of
exclusive arrangements only when used by "dominant" companies.

REPORT at 149.
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to a mechanical nonentity, as the Supreme Court did in the Standard
Stations case.'
The Report treats exclusive dealing contracts and tying arrangements differently. On exclusive dealing contracts, typified by the requirements arrangement, the StandardStations case, of course, becomes
the focal point of discussion of the statute's standards. The discussion
and the dissents reveal more plainly than anything else could how very
difficult it is even to verbalize, let alone apply, a satisfactory Clayton
Act test. The Report states that Standard Stations gave us a "
perplexing opinion whose rationale is not clear." " The Court held that
exclusive arrangements violate section 3 when they". . . foreclose[d]
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected." "
But it did not define what it meant by "foreclosure," and it made it
seem that any system of exclusive contracts which covered a "substantial portion of commerce" would be illegal, or borrowing the district
judge's interesting contribution to antitrust vocabulary, "quantitative
substantiality" of the commerce covered would be enough.
No word like "foreclosure" appears in the statute, and, in all
probability, the Court merely used the expression as synonymous with
the statute's "condition, agreement or understanding that the .
purchaser . . . shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the seller." Thus interpreted, the opinion
meant that an exclusive dealing agreement ("foreclosure") which
covers a substantial amount of business ("quantitative substantiality")
will as a matter of law have a "reasonable probability" of lessening
competition or tending to monopoly.
But this would have the effect of condemning virtually all exclusive dealing arrangements. On the face of the statute, on the legislative history, and above all on the assumption that antitrust policy
is not well-served by such unequivocal condemnation of an equivocal
practice, the Committee could not accept this result. Naturally anxious
to avoid a recommendation for overruling a Supreme Court decision
and noting signs that the courts and the Commission have recently
shied away from this strict approach, 6 the Committee adopts the
"foreclosure" language but seeks to give it a substance which will separate those arrangements which "clog competition in the channels of
distribution" from those which do not. "The central inquiry . . . is
whether a system of challenged exclusive arrangements in fact 'fore53. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
54. REPORT at 141.
55. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949).
56. "Sequels to Standard Stations have, however, retreated from any 'quantitative
substantiality' criterion." REPORT at 142.
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closes' competitors from a substantial market." Determination of actual
foreclosure requires an inquiry as to whether, in the "context and
actual practices of the particular industry," rival suppliers "can practicably secure consumer access in alternative ways." 5
Far from invalidating all exclusive contracts, this approach would
examine each arrangement in its market setting to see whether it really
precludes competitors from reasonable opportunity to market their
products. Tying up a substantial number of wholesalers may still
leave adequate opportunity for rival suppliers if other good wholesalers
are available. Tying up a substantial number of retailers likewise
may not necessarily hamper competitors, depending upon the nature
of the product and customary methods of handling it. On the other
hand, market facts may demonstrate that exclusion from even a low
percentage of available outlets may hamper rivals' access to consumers,
in which case sufficient "foreclosure" is present. Evaluation would involve many things including the nature of the product and its markets,
the size of the supplier,58 the terms of the agreements, their duration
and other factors. A short-term, or readily cancellable arrangement,
for example, may not foreclose at all.
Having found foreclosure, the Committee would end the inquiry
without requiring further economic evidence designed to prove the actual diminution in or "tangible damage" to the body of competition
in the market."9 This accords full play to the "reasonable probability"
concept by stopping the investigation at the point at which the first
real showing of a substantial danger to "competition" has been made.
Free of the section's language, we might want to condemn more or
less, but it is hard to see how a more faithful effort for carrying out
the mysterious mandate of the statute could be made. Criticism that
57. Id. at 146-47.
58. Disagreement between the majority and dissenting members seemingly centers
around what to do with the "dominant" company. See REPORT at 146: ". . . a
long-term exclusive arrangement exacted by a dominant supplier of an industrial
raw material would in fact foreclose competitors to a degree where economic harm
would be reasonably probable. . . ." Professor Schwartz stated: "Where a dominant
company begins to require its distributors to deal exclusively with it, I would strike
the practice down without waiting for the company to sign up so many distributors
that competitors experience difficulty reaching the consumer market." The Schwartz
Dissent, 1 ANTITRuST BtmL. 37, 57 (1955). It is unclear as to what either means
by a "dominant" company. See Adelman, General Comment on the Schwartz
Dissent, 1 ANTUST BuL.. 71, 78 (1955).
59. One author has pointed out that the Report does not make clear whether
this proposal means that a finding of foreclosure would be conclusive on illegality
or whether it would merely make a prima facie case, entitling the defendant to rebut
by producing evidence, if he can, that despite apparent "foreclosure," competition has
not been and will not be lessened. The defendant should certainly be allowed such
a showing. See McLaren, Exclusive Dealing, in Nw. Univ. L. School & ChI.B.A.
Cong. on Antitrust Laws & Att'y Gen's Comm. Rep't (May 10, 11, 1955) (hereinafter cited as Conference). These proceedings will be published later as a symposium
by Federal Legal Pub., Inc.
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this is an approach which is ".

.

.

'inconsistent with the Clayton Act

conception of stopping restrictive practices before they do demonstrable
harm'," o would seem to disregard the "effect" test which the statute
prescribes, for though it does not require "demonstrated" harm, it
does require that harm which could be "demonstrated" is probable.
Criticism that the approach is a reversion to Sherman Act standards
may or may not be correct, depending upon what one conceives Sherman Act standards for this area to be.
The Report's treatment of "tying" arrangements evidences the
antipathy to these practices which decades of judicial expressions have
exhibited. The Court's off-hand dictum in the Standard Stations
opinion is typical: "Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond
the suppression of competition." ' The Committee agrees and apparently endorses the InternationalSalt 12 proposition that tying arrangements which restrain a substantial volume of commerce are illegal
under section 3.
The Committee here seems to be in the position of espousing a
"quantitative substantiality" rule for one practice under section 3 and
disavowing it for another. This tough attitude toward tying may be
quite sensible, depending upon how tying is defined. The Report
several times characterizes the "tying" it is talking about as involving
the "wielding of monopolistic leverage." ' Perhaps the clearest statement of the definition, and the rule occurs in a footnote:
"Obviously not every business transaction which conditions
the sale of one 'item' on the purchase of another can be condemned
as a 'tying" arrangement or 'monopolistic' practice to which
serious legal risks should attach. Rather, a genuine 'tying' clause
-properly subject to strict antitrust controls-presupposes a distinct and 'dominant' product conferring some substantial economic
power on the seller enabling him to coerce buyers of a different
commodity in which he otherwise enjoys no competitive advantage." 04
60. See dissent by Professor Schwartz "and a few others." REPORT at 149. Cf.
statement of retiring Federal Trade Commissioner Mead (press release Sept. 23, 1955)
that the "per se doctrine does not apply and should not be applied" to Clayton Act
cases. On this issue, the economic approach taken by the Commission in the Maico

case, F.T.C. Dkt. 5822 (Dec. 2, 1953), is in sharp contrast to the argument of Commission counsel before the court of appeals in the Dictograph case, and to the decision of the court. Dictograph Products, Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
61. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
62. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
63. REPORT at 140, 144, 145. The phrase is from Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953).
64. REPORT at 144 n.60.
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If the seller enjoys a "dominant" position in the "tying" product, then
his use of this leverage as a competitive weapon in the field of the "tied"
product may well look sufficiently dangerous in itself that the inquiry
into probable effect on competition in the field of the "tied" product
should end. It could be argued, however, that even in such cases, a
further look should be taken to see where the impact of the tying occurs. In most of the decided cases, the impact was upon the ultimate
consumer of the "tied" product to whom a machine, the "tying" device, had been leased.65 Where a substantial number of consumers
are thus foreclosed to competitors, the test of "actual foreclosure from
a substantial market" is met, just as it would be met if ordinary requirements contracts were executed with a substantial number of consumers. But suppose the "tie" is imposed only upon an intermediate
distributor and not upon consumers? Actual foreclosure may not
really occur, and a hasty leap to presumed guilt may ignore market
reality. 6 Nevertheless there may still be merit in the presumption that
no one with a "dominant" position imposes a "tie" unless he is doing
it for monopolistic reasons. This may be a practical rule founded upon
sufficient experience to merit its use as a doctrine, although the contrary
has been forcefully and ably argued.67
But suppose there is no "dominant" power in the "tying" product. The above-quoted definition would indicate that this would not
be genuine "tying" in the antitrust sense. The Report, however, seemingly approves the International Salt case, which involved patent control over the machine but no demonstrated dominance, and cites three
cases in which illegality without dominance was found.6" The possibility is present here that dominance is being inferred from the mere
fact that a tying contract is successfully imposed. But the Report's
above-quoted definition in effect repudiates such an inference. We find,
65. All the following cases involved leases of machinery to industrial consumers
of the tied in supplies: International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) ;
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936);
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 258 U.S. 451 (1922); Thomson Mfg.
Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945); Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC,
132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942); Oxford Varnish Corp. v. Ault & Wiborg Corp., 83
F.2d 764 (6th Cir. 1936).
66. In FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), the leasing of gasoline pumps with the restriction that only the lessor's gasoline be dispensed therefrom
was upheld under § 3; the decision of the Court was grounded on the conclusion
that oil company competitors were not really foreclosed from access to the lessees.
The Court in the International Business Machines case distinguished the Sinclair
case not only on the above ground but apparently also on the ground that there was
no foreclosure from consumers of gasoline, for the Court stated that ".

.

. the only

use made of the gasoline was to sell it." International Business Machines Corp. v.
United States, 298 U.S. 131, 135 (1936).
67. Stevens, Tying Arrangements, in Conference, supra note 59.
68. REPoRT at 140 & r.40.
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therefore, sufficient difficulty with managing a special "tying" rule
that it might be well to consider whether a different approach would
not work.
It would seem that the Report's "actual foreclosure" test for exclusive dealing arrangements ought to work quite well for tying arrangements. If "dominance" exists and is proved, not presumed, at
least a prima facie case of probable effect could be found, although there
ought to be some room for a defense showing that the character of
the "tie" was not in fact one which produced foreclosure. If "dominance" is proved not to exist, the case is like any other exclusive
dealing case. The Committee's "foreclosure" rule could seemingly
handle a lot more territory than the Committee itself suggested.
A further word about "ties" may be pertinent, however. Conditioning the sale of a given quantity of one product upon the purchase
of a given quantity of another may not be within the scope of section
3 at all. In the machine cases, where the lease was conditioned upon
purchase of materials for that machine, the courts have been satisfied
by evidence that the "practical effect" under the circumstances was
to preclude purchasing from a competitor. 9 This result was clearly
consonant with the legislative intent. But mere quantity purchase
agreements are not treated as exclusive dealing arrangements, and many
apparent "ties" of a given quantity may be no different from quantity
purchase agreements involving only a single commodity. The issue
is not whether a "tie" is present, but whether anything is present which
section 3's language will reach. This is a largely unexplored frontier
of the field of exclusive dealing.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND "FAIR TRADE"

The "fair trade" system achieves resale price maintenance and
dealer price-fixing by means of state laws providing "non-signer" control and federal laws providing antitrust exemption. The first federal
exemption, the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act in
1937, failed expressly to mention non-signer control, and the Supreme
Court seized this loophole to scuttle the system in the Schwegmann
case. ° Congress almost immediately passed the McGuire Amendment
in 1952 to restore the system, this time attaching the exemption to the
Federal Trade Commission Act and leaving the totally eclipsed MillerTydings Amendment still on the books.
69. See International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131,
135 (1936); Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952, 958 (1st Cir.

1945).
70. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); see
61 YAix L.J. 381 (1952), 46 Ii. L. Ray. 349 (1951).
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It has always been urged that these federal laws are mere "enabling" acts designed to allow the states to carry out policy unhampered
by federal interference. In fact, however, the laws are king-pins of
the system, are diametrically opposed to historic antitrust policy 1 and
are representative of a definite congressional policy to permit dealers
to avoid the rigors of price competition.72 In addition, the laws serve
the purpose of giving manufacturers of advertised merchandise a means
of preventing "loss leader" sales which are thought to impair the goodwill associated with the product name. This second reason, which was
probably the original reason for the development of resale price maintenance, important though it may be to some manufacturers, would
never rally enough support to produce the vast federal and state legislative program which we now have in the "fair trade" system. The
desire of various dealer groups to obtain relief from price competition
has undoubtedly furnished the major support for the laws.
There may be great social merit in the aims of this legislation
in giving small retailers some measure of economic security, and there
may be some competitive merit in providing a means of "loss leader"
control. But the system, as the Committee found, is an inappropriate
method of "loss leader" control because it kills all price competition
in the process of halting this "evil." As a security measure for
dealers, the Committee had to condemn it, not because of lack of
sympathy for dealers, but because the system involves such a bold and
obvious flouting of the simplest antitrust principles that it cannot be
tolerated by any group which accepts antitrust as an article of faith.
Thus, the Report states that "fair trade" is ".

.

. at odds with

the most elementary principles of a dynamic free enterprise system." It
is "an unwarranted compromise," its inevitable concomitant is "throttling of price competition," and it ".

.

. not only symbolizes a radical

departure from National antitrust policy without commensurate gains,
but extends an invitation for further encroachment on the free-market
philosophy that the antitrust laws subserve." 7 A few members expressed doubts and a few dissented.
One dissenting member objected that the Committee's conclusion
stemmed largely from logic, whereas experience has demonstrated that
these laws (and the Robinson-Patman Act) are important to the
economic welfare of thousands of local businessmen. 74 The Report
71. REPoRT at 150-54.
72. President Truman signed the McGuire Act with the observation that"... it
does have value in eliminating certain unfair competitive practices, and thereby will
help small businessmen to stay in business-which I believe is a healthy thing
for our economy and our society." 1 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) 113040.10.
73. REPORT at 154.

74. Id. at 220.
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is probably deficient in not undertaking some demonstration that experience with the laws has also been detrimental to the "economic
welfare" of thousands of consumers. But it would seem that a contest
of welfares is beside the point anyway, for despite the importance of
the teachings of experience, a "policy" surely must have at least a little
logic, and with "fair trade" in the United States Code, our present
antitrust policy is in danger of being thought to possess no logic at all.
The Report is probably deficient in not fully accounting for the
other methods of resale price inaintenance.75 Refusal to deal with
price-cutting retailers along the Colgate7 ' route is one method, but
this is comprehensively covered in the "refusal to deal" sectionY A
second method is the "agency" system, reliant upon consignment sales
for escape from the implications of conspiracy. The goods belong to
the manufacturer in the dealer's hands, and the former is therefore
privileged to set the selling price, provided the agency is bona fide."
The Report is remiss in not analyzing this method, although it is so
cumbersome and expensive that it is unattractive to most manufacturers. Its antitrust incidents are complicated by the fact that consignment selling is a perfectly normal and legitimate commercial device in
and of itself. Consequently, no per se rule could be applied without
at the same time invalidating many innocuous consignments. If, however, this system should appear to be used as a subterfuge for illegal
price-fixing, antitrust should certainly be capable of dealing with the
situation, and the General Electric " doctrine could well be modified to
permit an inquiry into the reasonableness of the practice in light of
the particular circumstances.
Agency selling is a tiny manifestation of vertical integration. Full
integration forward to retail channels of course gives power to dictate
retail prices, and the Committee has been criticized for not treating
vertical integration as a problem of resale price maintenance.8 0 To
regard vertical integration as a method of price maintenance is like
75. The Report is criticized for this omission in Adams, Resale Price Maintenance; Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967 (1955); testimony of Senator Sparkman
before Antitrust Subcommittee of House Judiciary Committee. Hearings, supra note
22, at 144-47 (transcript).
76. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
77. REoRT at 132-37.
78. United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) ; cf. FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953) (agency no escape
from exclusive dealing contract under § 5 of the FTC Act; "the crucial fact is the
impact of the particular practice on competition, not the label that it carries."

Id. at 397).

79. United States v. General Electric Co., supra note 78.

80. Testimony of Senator Sparkman.
(transcript).

Hearings, supra note 22, at 144-47
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regarding the firing of an engine's boiler as a means of keeping the
engineer warm. The Report fully treats integration in its proper setting under section 7 of the Clayton Act and under the Sherman Act."
It has also been suggested that there is a basic inconsistency in
the Report's approval of patent license price-fixing under the General
Electric rule 82 and its disapproval of resale price maintenance. The
two things are not the same, and, in fact, the Patent Chapter of the
Report recognizes the illegality of resale price-fixing under the guise
Nevertheless, the objection to price-fixing and all
of patent control.'
its works certainly encompasses use of a patent to fix a competitor's
selling price, and the majority's approval of the General Electric rule
is a bow to the patent system and not to the antitrust laws. It may
be observed, however, that the legal hazards in which such price-fixing
have been enveloped by decisional law make its use extremely unsafe.
Congress is not likely to convene a special session to consider
repeal of a law which it passed in 1952 by a plurality resembling those
rolled up in declarations of war. It is probable that the "fair trade"
system will collapse on its home ground long before it suffers legislative demise. In some areas there is currently widespread disregard
of "fair trade" prices as competition in a buyer's market keeps bursting through. 4 An additional hazard has developed in the state courts,
with "fair trade," or at least non-signer control, being found unconstitutional in several states in recent years." If many state courts
follow the present trend, it is possible that the next step will be a
proposal for a positive federal "fair trade" law to supplant state laws.
Perhaps the Report may at least serve to bolster congressional opposition to such a move.
"Fair trade" is not without its doctrinal problems. There is the
federal constitutional question, recently avoided by the Supreme Court
by its refusal of certiorari in the Eli Lilly case."6 A big problem exists
in the issue of whether a vertically-integrated manufacturer may set
81. REPORT CC. 1 & 3.
82. Testimony of Professor Schwartz before Antitrust Subcommittee of House
Judiciary Committee. Hearings, supra note 22, at 335 (transcript).
83. REPORT at 240.
84. A majority of a large number of businessmen polled by Tide Magazine
expressed the opinion that fair trade will not exist on a broad scale for more than
two years. Tide, June 4, 1955, p. 20.
85. At this writing, "fair trade" laws have been held unconstitutional in entirety, or as to non-signer control, in ten states under the decisions of five high courts
and five lower courts. All of these decisions have occurred in the past three years. 1
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) 13085.
86. Schwegmann Bros. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 856 (1953). Note, Fair Trade-Does It Warrant Re-Examinatio?, 48
Nw. U.L. REv. 777 (1954). See generally on current problems, Derenberg, Trade
Regulatio , 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 345, 352 (1955).
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the resale prices of independent outlets with which his own stores compete, as against the law's proviso against horizontal price-fixing." The
McGuire Amendment's attempted overruling of the Wenting case8 8
to permit application of state non-signer control to interstate sales,
together with the whole problem of extra-territoriality of the state
laws, will continue to be a fruitful problem for litigation; and the perpetual question of the meaning of the "free and open competition"
requirement of the federal law is always with us.
The Committee adroitly avoided grappling with these legal issues
by the simple expedient of urging outright repeal.
PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Although price discrimination may occasionally become involved
in Sherman Act proceedings,"9 the subject is largely dominated by
the Robinson-Patman Act. The Department of Justice has full power
to enforce both the civil and criminal provisions of the act, but it almost never does so, the act being the virtually exclusive property of
the Federal Trade Commission and the private treble damage litigant.
The Report's failure to subject the act to fundamental inquiry
has been discussed above. This is a major weakness, but nevertheless
the Report's careful construction of the act's various provisions is a
distinct contribution. From a practical point of view, it is perhaps
well that the Report did not recommend repeal; the act would stay
with us anyway, and we might have lost the benefit of the Report's
thoughtful, detailed recommendations for making life with the act at
least a little more rational.
Nearly 70 pages of tightly-packed discussion (17 per cent of the
entire Report) are addressed to the act's provisions. Comment on
this whole discussion would take an equal number of pages. Since
this is out of the question, remarks here are limited to some of the most
significant recommendations.
It would be well to bear in mind the Report's main thesis for
Robinson-Patman Act interpretation: that there should be ". . . resolution of every statutory doubt in favor of the Sherman Act's basic
87. Section 5(a) (5), 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(5) (1952). See discussion in Comment, The Dual Entrepreneur and Fair Trade, 50 Nw. U.L. REv.
78 (1955).
88. Sunbeam Corp. v. Wentling, 185 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1951).
89. See, e.g., New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. United States, 173
F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949). See REPORT at 164 n.116, for the Committee's contention that
when price discrimination of the sort dealt with in the Robinson-Patman Act is
attacked under the Sherman Act (or Federal Trade Commission Act), the proceeding should be governed by Clayton Act provisions.
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antitrust directives," 'othat is, that application of the Robinson-Patman
Act should be harmonized with the policy of free competition. This
"reconciliation" theme, which acknowledges the conflict in philosophy
symbolized by the act, seeks to give the statute at least the semblance of
an "inner logic" which it now lacks." But with the statute being
essentially anti-competitive in aim, it must be anticipated that despite
the Report's optimistic tone, miracles cannot be expected.
Effect on Competition and Burden of Proof
Section 2(a),2 in accordance with standard Clayton Act technique, prescribes an "effect on competition" test, and this, by any standard, would seem to be a substantive matter. Section 2(b) 93 contains
a burden of proof provision, a procedural matter. Substance and procedure became united in one concept, however, in the incredible Moss "
doctrine that mere proof of a price discrimination constitutes a prima
facie case and that it is up to the respondent to demonstrate a lack of
adverse effect. This not only placed upon respondents the burden of
proving a negative; but its chief significance was that it necessarily
meant that adverse effect on competition was not an integral element
in the violation. More than any other decision, this construction proclaimed open warfare between the act and "antitrust policy."
The Report renounces the Moss doctrine, and the only surprising
thing about this is that a few Committee members dissented." The
Report's position is based not only upon a "sound and accurate reading
of the Act," but is compelled by the thesis that reconciliation of the
statute can be accomplished only on the level of real inquiry into competitive effect. This construction received major support in the Supreme Court's Automatic Canteen " rationale and in the direct decision
90. REPORT at 131.
91. See Levi, in Symposium, The Robinsoi-Patman Act-Is It in the Public Interest?, A.B.A. SEcroN OF ATITRUST LAw 60 (1952): ". . . its concepts and
theories are incomplete and contradictory, and the Act as a whole has no inner logic to
remedy these defects." Id. at 68. See the same author's general observation that:
"The central question . . .for a society which wishes to be competitive must be to
ask whether with all the dangers that the Act represents of imposing and strengthening patterns of non-competitive and government regulated behavior this legislation
is really necessary; either because of the protection it gives the small against the
large, or because of such curbing of monopolistic abuses as it is thought to achieve.
The larger deficiencies of the Act call less for legislative tampering than they do for
an answer to this basic question." Id. at 73. On the problems of the act generally
see Sunderland, The Robinson-PatinanAct, A General Appraisal, in Conference, supra
note 59.
92. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952).
93. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
94. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945).
95. REPoRT at 163. See The Schwartz Dissent, 1 Aw=rusT BuLL.37, 57 (1955).
96. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
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of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the MinneapolisHoneywell case.9 7 And most important of all, the Commission itself
disavowed the Moss theory in its recent GeneralFoods opinion." The
Committee's position almost certainly will represent the law on this
question.
Restoring the "effect" test to its proper procedural position does
not mean that it will thereby achieve great practical significance. In
the Morton Salt case,99 the Supreme Court held that the Commission
may infer the requisite effect, where buyer competition is concerned,
from the mere fact that the discrimination is reflected in different resale
prices. Even absent an effect on such prices, statutory injury may
result from the fact that the discrimination gives one buyer more profit
than another. The Commission has been alert to translate these ideas
into positive action which has tended to bring all but the most inconsequential differentiations between competing buyers within the scope
of section 2 (a).
If potential illegality of most price diffetentiations is the thing
which brings the act into "collisions" with antitrust policy by fostering "price uniformity and rigidity in open conflict" with the purpose
of the Sherman Act,' ° reconciliation without major revision of the
"effect" test may be difficult indeed.'"'
The Report avoids any recommendation for a change in language and concentrates on an effort
to interpret existing language in such a way as to achieve compatibility.
The statute speaks of lessening of or injury to competition, not of
injury to competitors. The inquiry must therefore go beyond mere
focus on individual competitors' sales or profits and must ascertain
the probable effect upon the "vigor of competition in the market" and
the "health of the competitive process." A "thorough economic analysis" of market data is called for."°
This interpretation is based upon an accurate reading of the statute, upon traditional Clayton Act reasoning, and upon the Report's
reconciliation theme. It is nevertheless difficult to reduce to operative
effect. The statute is not only an "incipiency" statute calling for a
97. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951).
98. General Foods Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5675 (April 27, 1954).
99. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
100. REPoRT at 131.
101. The 1936 amendment, which added the "injure, prevent or destroy" phraseology was plainly designed to broaden the condemnations of the statute; see note
102 infra. The Committee might at least have considered repeal of this language,
although the language that would remain would probably itself be sufficient to continue the strict approach now in vogue, as the analogies of § 3 of the Clayton Act
and the Standard Stations case show.
102. REPoRT at 164-65. See Levy, Section 2(a) of the Robinscn-Panman Act,
in Conference, supra note 59.
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prediction of what "may be," but its assumption that price discrimination is an immediately dangerous phenomenon results in a failure to
supply an internal concept which will enable separation of those injuries
to competitors which will and those which will not injure competition.1"' It is therefore impossible for the Report to produce a differentiating formula, as it did in its "actual foreclosure" test for section 3.
The result is that the Report is able to say that the focus should not
be exclusively on sales or profits, but it is unable to point to the com0
mercial activities and market facts upon which focus should be made.Y
The matter tends to become one of degree rather than of difference in
kind.
The difficulties are already evident in recent Commission decisions. Although the Commission has asserted its intention to justify
its role as an expert by avoiding mechanical rules and by making a real
examination of economic data in Clayton Act cases,10 5 its most recent
price discrimination opinions have still focused on profits of individual
competitors and have riot revealed any real effort to go beyond to an
appraisal of overall competitive health.' 0 6 And even if subsequent decisions do require a broader inquiry, reconciliation with antitrust policy
will remain a difficult goal so long as price differentiation evidencing
vigorous competition between sellers may be attacked as an injury
to competition among buyers.
Injury to buyer competition is the act's chief concern, but it also
applies to injury to seller competition. The operative relationship of
price discrimination to effect on seller competition is obviously quite
different from its relation to buyer competition. There may be no rational connection at all between a seller's differentiation in price be103. S. RFP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936) laid down a principle
for the act's construction which is hard to ignore, explaining that the language
of the original § 2 of the Clayton Act had ". . . in practice been too restrictive in requiring a showing of general injury to competitive conditions in the line of commerce
concerned, whereas the more immediately important concern is an injury to the
competitor victimized by the discrimination. Only through such injuries, in fact,
can the larger injury result, and to catch the weed in the seed will keep it from
coming to flower." See Note, The Robinson-Patinan Act in Action, 46 YALE
L.J. 447, 450 (1937).
104. See RFPoRT at 165; note 103 supra.
105. Pillsbury Mills Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6000 (Dec. 21, 1953); Maico Corp.,
F.T.C. Dkt. 5822 (Dec. 7, 1953).
106. In several recent automotive parts cases, the Commission invalidated price
differentials among competing purchasers on the ground that the price differences
resulted in varying profit margins for the different customers. No attention was paid
to the question of the "vigor of competition" in the buyers' market. Whittaker Cable
Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 5722 (April 29, 1955); Moog Industries, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 5723
(April 29, 1955) ; E. Edelmann & Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5770 (April 29, 1955) ; 3 CCH
TRADF REG. REP. (10th ed.) 1125443 to 445. Commissioner Mason, dissenting in these
cases, contended that the decisions rested simply on the Morton Salt doctrine and that
the Commission was really drawing the inference of illegal effect on competition solely
from the fact that the discounts granted were substantial.
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tween customers and his competitive success against other sellers of
similar commodities. The act contains no language giving recognition
to the vastly different nature of the problem here, but fortunately the
courts have largely seemed to sense that too much direct legal interference with price competition between sellers threatens serious danger
to antitrust policy. 1°7 It is unfortunate, however, that the Report does
not propose some pertinent standards for this separate problem. 08 The
one good thing about section 3 of the Robinson-P'atman Act is that
it recognizes that this is a problem which should be analyzed only in
terms of "predatory intent." 109
Cost Justification
The cost justification proviso is a concession to efficiency, but it
has proved so far to be a slight concession indeed." 0 Its very existence
in the statute, however, suggests the kind of economy which the draftsmen of the act seem to have envisaged. Only in an economy in which
sellers' prices are free from competitive influence and in which demand
for products is inelastic can sellers accurately determine in advance of
sales what the unit production and distribution costs of their products
will be. Cost justification, in principle, suggests a static and controlled
market. Competition and fluctuations in consumer demand disrupt
nice calculations, and this will always make such a defense difficult to
establish.
But anything which contributes to some flexibility in the act is
ipso facto worthwhile. The Report indicates that the proviso does
offer the possibility of justification for some differentials if good faith
subjective judgments are accorded weight, if reasonable approximations rather than exact measurements are required, if joint costs may
be allocated among reasonable categories rather than among individual
transactions, and if sound accounting procedures will be honored."'
107. Cf. the opinion in General Foods, F.T.C. Dkt. 5675 (April 27, 1954), stating
that the issue of injury to competition on the seller level is governed by the same
standards as the issue on the buyer level, although the economic inquiry which must
be made is different. The Report agrees. REPORT at 162-63; cf. Purex Corp., Ltd.,
F.T.C. Dkt. 6008 (April 16, 1954); Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC,
191 F2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951).
108. For discussion, see Comment, The Standard of Injury Applicable to FirstLine Competition, 49 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 209 (1954).
109. Section 3 states, in part: "It shall be unlawful . . . to sell or contract to
sell, goods in any part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by said
person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying competition, or
eliminating a competitor in such part of the United States." 49 STAT. 1528 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13a (1952). (Emphasis added.)
the cost defense has proved largely illusory in
110. REPORT at 171: "...
practice."
111. REPORT at 172-75. For discussion, see Massel, Cost Justification, in Conference, supra note 59.
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The difficulty is that both legal ambiguities in the statute and great
problems in administration have combined to frustrate the defense.
The Committee finds that too often the Commission and the courts have
imposed arbitrary and unrealistic requirements upon those attempting
justification and have failed to evolve workable criteria which can be
followed by those who seek in good faith to comply.1"
The Report does not regard statutory revision as essential, although it suggests a new text in the event that administration in the
future does not measure up to reasonable standards." 8 The Committee commends the recent appointment of an Advisory Committee to
the Commission to propose technical accounting standards. It also
emphasizes that many of the problems are legal and not accounting
questions, and on this level its most important recommendation is
its general advice: ".

.

. [w]e recommend recognition that a Robin-

son-Patman cost defense is not susceptible to testing by precise or
mechanical rules." 114 The Report goes on to commend the general
principles summarized above.
Two important legal principles are suggested which will add to
the reasonableness of the defense. One, already recognized by the
Commission," 5 is that a de minimis principle should prevent failure
of a defense which only falls short of full justification by a "fractional
amount"; this can be achieved within the "due allowance" language
of the proviso. The second is that where a cost justification falls
short of covering the full differential, the act should nevertheless not
be offended if the unjustified portion of the differential would alone be
insufficient to cause the requisite competitive injury. This requires
a reasonable application of the "effect on competition" test and is a
principle which, if it commends itself to enforcement bodies, will greatly
amplify the utility of the cost proviso.
Quantity Limits
The "quantity limits" proviso, which permits the Commission to
place a ceiling on justifiable cost differentials, carried the ineptitude in
draftsmanship which characterizes the act to new heights. It has
112. REPoRT at 172-73.

See Comment, Cost Justification Under the Robinson-

Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 237 (1954).
113. REPORT at 175 n.162: "That nothing shall prevent price differentials which
make only due allowance for savings in any of the seller's costs, determined by any
sound accounting principles, which may reasonably flow from differences in the
categories of transactions involved." (Italics omitted.)
114. Id. at 174.
115. The B. F. Goodrich Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5677 (1954).
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been employed in only one industry, and the complexity of the issues
now being litigated in the resulting case plainly reveals the immense
difficulties which the proviso's "novel and perplexing criteria" create.16
But litigation could iron out the worst ambiguities, and the Committee
does not halt with objection to the language.
In spirit, the quantity-limits proviso authorizes the Commission
to engage in a limited form of direct price-fixing, and it is an instance
in which the act's disbelief in competition comes plainly to the surface.
Price-fixing may be a legitimate government activity, but it is not a
legitimate part of an antitrust policy. The Committee's faith in the
value of competition led it inevitably to condemn the proviso as "
ineptly sanctioning a crude form of price-fixing by administrative fiat
where competition should safeguard the public interest." 117 Strangely,
the Report pauses at the doorstep and does not expressly recommend
repeal as it did at the end of its comparable objections to "fair trade."
But there can be no doubt as to where the Committee stood on the
question. Only three members dissented.
The Meeting Competition Defense
The "meeting competition" defense of section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act is one of the hottest battlegrounds of the statute. It
is an arena in which the conflicting aspirations surrounding the act come
into obvious clash. The conflict underlying section 2(a) is broader
and deeper, but it is obscured by the fact that the section is piously
cast in the language of antitrust. But the "meeting competition" proviso expressly poses the question: may the seller compete with a price
differentiation, or not? If the act will not permit such competition, it
is plainly anti-competitive. But the act cannot permit very much of
such competition without being destroyed. The most ardent RobinsonPatman supporters will have none of it; the Committee was not very
ardent about the act, but it accepted it in principle and though its procompetition philosophy required it to allow the proviso to have some
utility, it could not propose a defense which would undermine the act.
The result is a set of recommendations which seek to give the proviso
a little room in which to operate but which rather carefully confine
it within safe limits.
The Report begins by strongly approving the Standard Oil decision 118 that the defense is substantive and not a mere procedural
116. The B. F. Goodrich Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1953); see
Comment, The Quantity Discount and Now the Quantity Limit, 49 Nw. U.L. REv.

251 (1954).

117. REPORT at 177.
118. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
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maneuver to compel the Commission to produce evidence of effect on
competition. The Commission's strange position that the proviso was
only procedural was founded on the rationale exhibited in the Moss
case that the Commission does not have the burden of showing "effect"; "' this rationale was essential to the theory that the proviso
was procedural, for if the Commission had to show effect in the first
instance, there would be nothing whatever for the proviso to do. The
departure of Moss would make the Commission's old position untenable.
The Standard Oil opinion, though holding that "actual competition, at least in this elemental form, is thus preserved," 120 did not
have a good opportunity to lay down the ground rules of the defense.
The Report sets forth a number of standards for application of the
defense which it believes can be derived from the existing language of
the statute. Chief among these are: (1) The defense contemplates
a good faith effort to meet an actual competitor's price; a general aim
of meeting competitive conditions in the abstract will not do. 121 (2) The
seller must reasonably believe that the competitor's price is itself "lawful" under the act."2 (3) The defense is not confined to sporadic situations, but may be used to ". . . cope with competitive pressures so
long as they exist. . . ." m (4) The seller must aim only to "meet"

the competitor's price, but is entitled to a reasonable mistake under the
Staley formula. 4 (5) Dollar-for-dollar meeting is not necessarily the
test if there are competitive price differences between the two products;
the seller's price may seek to "equalize the competitive situation," and
this may mean going below the competitor's price in some instances and
119. See text at note 94 supra.
120. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1951). See Comment, The Meeting Competition Defense Under Section 2(b), 49 Nw. U.L. REV.
261 (1954).
121. This is based on FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945), and is
illustrated in the recent decisions of the Commission in E. Edelmann & Co., F.T.C.
Dkt. 5770 (April 29, 1955).
122. A dispute still rages over whether the Court's reference to "lawful" prices
in the Standard Oil opinion meant that the seller bears the absolute risk that his
compeitor's price is unlawful, or merely that the seller must reasonably believe that
the price is lawful. The distinction makes a tremendous difference. Two Commission hearing examiners are under the impression that the Commission will only
require "reasonable belief"; see initial decisions in C. E. Niehoff & Co., F.T.C. Dkt.
5768 (Aug. 2, 1954) and E. Edelmann & Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5770 (March 29, 1954).
The full Commission in the Edelnann case, however, recently avoided expressing
itself on this question on the ground that it was not necessary to the disposition
of the case. 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (10th ed.) 125445, at p. 35562.
For the view that the lawfulness requirement should be totally dispensed with
see Stevens, Defense of Meeting the Lower Price of a Competitor, MiCE. U. INST.
ON FFD. ANTITRUST LAWS 129 (1953).
123. REPoa'r at 182.
124. FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945).
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staying above it in others. 12 (6) The seller may meet
competition for
126
a new customer as well as for an existing customer.
These are reasonable suggestions designed to bring the defense
into some conformity with business actualities without permitting it to
go very far toward curtailment of the act's basic directives. As the
Report points out, the defense has yet to be successful in a single decided case. The complex requirements of the defense, even as sympathetically interpreted by the Report, do not promise to extend the
boundaries of the proviso very far into the land of free competition.
The Report observes that without the defense there would be "irreconcilable conflict" with the Sherman Act. But if the price equalization
which the defense contemplates were achieved by private agreement
without legislative sanction, it would be a criminal offense, and so some
question remains as to whether full reconciliation has been achieved.
Sections 2(c), (d) and (e)

27

By any standard of statutory consistency, the brokerage, services
and allowances subsections are anomalies. Though they deal with
forms of price discrimination, they give their subject-matter quite
different substantive treatment from that contained in the basic subsection 2(a). No doubt brokerage and allowances have on occasion
been used as subterfuges for passing concealed price discriminations to
favored customers, and no doubt such payments, even when made in
exchange for real services performed by the customer, may be regarded
as economic benefits which should be controlled if Congress so chooses.
But why should not such practices be subjected to the same "effect"
test and be qualified by the same defenses as any other form of so-called
"price discrimination" ?
The Report notes that the services and allowances subsections
in practice have received quite reasonable construction by the Commission, though the brokerage subsection has ironically been perverted
into a weapon against voluntary organizations of the very independent
125. REPoRT at 183-84. This is the only rational rule, unless the defense is to
be allowed only in industries in which products are relatively homogeneous and of
identical cost and consumer acceptance. The Commission has clearly recognized this
principle in holding that a seller of a premium product may not go as low as the
dollar and cents price of a competitor's less popular product where the result would
really amount to undercutting in a realistic competitive sense. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, 396-97 (1948); FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 189
F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1951).
126. This is a controversial question, too, for the Court in the Standard Oil
case, without any basis in the language of the statute, referred to the defense as one
of "self-defense." 340 U.S. at 249-50.

127. 49

STAT.

1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(c), (d) and (e) (1952).
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merchants whom the act was designed to protect.128 But as to all
subsections, the obvious requirements of reconciliation with broader
antitrust policy would dictate that competitive effect be demonstrated,
and the Report therefore recommends that these provisions be "harmonized" with the overall standards of the act. The surprising thing
is that the Committee halted there without recommending any legislation to accomplish this. Designation of the present subject-matter of
the subsections as definitions of "indirect price discrimination" within
the present coverage of section 2(a) would do the job.
The Report also recommends that the "for services rendered"
clause of subsection 2 (c), which has been read out of the act by judicial
decision, be legislatively restored to "original vigor." 129 This is a
commendable suggestion, but the Report contains no proposal as to
what kind of implementing legislation should be drawn. Consequently,
it is not clear how this change could be effected without impairing the
act's aim to prevent chains from receiving compensation for the integrated functions they perform, and the proposal will require careful
consideration.3 0
Buyer Liability
The buyer liability subsection, 2(f),'31 received its first Supreme
Although
Court interpretation in the Automatic Canteen decision.,
the decision was technically concerned with determining the burden of
proof of a seller cost justification asserted by the buyer, resolution of
this question led the Court into a general construction of the subsection. The resulting decision that the subsection applies only to buyers
who reasonably know that the price concessions to them are unlawful
under the act went far to relieve entrepreneurs in their role as purchasers from the strictures of the statute.
The rationale of the Court carried an emphasis which was strikingly different from its past decisions on the act, except for the Standard Oil opinion, and as already noted, its expression of a duty to reconcile the act with antitrust policy was adopted as the central guide of
the Distribution Chapter. The Court's particular concern was for a
128. REpoRT at 188, 190-91. For discussion and criticism of this section of the
Report, see Gooder, Sections 2(c), (d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, in Conference, supra note 59.
129. REPoRT at 192. Generally, see Comment, Indirect Discrimination Under the
Robinson-PatinanAct, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 225 (1954).
130. See Gooder, supra note 128; cf. problem of functional discounts discussed
at pp. 218-21 infra.
131. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(f) (1952).
132. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
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phenomenon of the free market which is not always emphasized and
which suggests that the Court may have been reading Professor Galbraith's recent book."' In the words of the Report, the Court was impressed with "the imperative necessity for preserving the legal freedom
of buyers to engage in aggressive bargaining over price as basic to
effectively competitive distribution." 134 The Court's opinion was indeed a powerful brief for this brand of freedom, and the Report quite
naturally gives its whole-hearted endorsement. The result reached
by the Court is quite consistent with the language of subsection 2 (f) .135
The present legal situation, however, underscores the dislocation
in bargaining which subsection 2(a) produces. It takes two to make
a bargain, and presumably the best elements of bargaining occur when
the strength of the participants is roughly similar. The law now frees
the buyer to bargain for anything which he does not know is illegal.
But the seller has no such privilege and will be caught if the resulting
bargain is illegal whether he knows of its illegality or not. The Court
could do nothing about this disparity; but Congress could, if it were
disposed to regard the value of "sturdy bargaining" as highly as did
the Court.
Criminal Liability
Many pages could be written about the strange and occasionally
indeterminate concepts embodied in section 3 of the Robinson-Patman
Act. The Report ably catalogues its basic defects and concludes with
the recommendation, apparently unanimous, that it be repealed, stating
cryptically: "It does not serve the public interest of antitrust policy." 2
The section, being criminal, cannot be enforced by the Federal
Trade Commission; the Department of Justice, notably disinterested
in any of the price discrimination legislation, has seldom resorted to
it. Its chief use in fact has been in treble damage litigation where it
crept by a strange combinadoes not belong at all, but into which it 3has
7
oversight.
judicial
and
tion of accident
The Report's repeal recommendation was undoubtedly heavily influenced by the basic effort of the Committee to reconcile the price
law with antitrust. Not only is the section so difficult to interpret that
133.

GALRAIT,

PowER 147-51 (1952).

AdERICAN

CAPITAusmS;

THE CoNcEPT

OF

COUNTERVAILNG

134. REPORT at 196.
135. See Comment, Buyer's Responsibility under the Robinon-Patman Act, 49

Nw. U.L. REv. 273 (1954).

136. RZoRT at 201. See Comment, The Meaning and Judicial Development of
Section Three of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 285 (1954).
137. Id. at 288-89.
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its chief effect is to produce chagrin and harassment, but there can be
no excuse for attaching the threat of criminal penalty to ordinary commercial competitive conduct.
Functional Discounts
The Report's discussion of the problem of "functional discounts"
could, with a few changes, be converted into a brief for the repeal
of the act. No other area of the statute's application shows quite so
clearly the static conception of the economy implicit in the act as well as
the great damage which the statute can do to efficiency and progress
in distribution techniques. A careful reading of this section of the
Report should give all who are concerned with the statute, of whatever persuasion, cause for reflection.
If distribution functions were all precisely segregated among different levels of manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing activity, there
would be little problem, and this may have been the pattern of earlier
days. But in our "dynamic economy," in the language of the Report,
there is a "proliferation of modern marketing units" which "defies
neat nomenclature and descriptive labels." 138 Manufacturers do much
of their own distribution. Wholesalers sell at retail. Retailers integrate backward to perform wholesaling functions. Manufacturers
and wholesalers sell both at wholesale and at retail.
Two major kinds of problems illustrate the effects of application
of statute to this "proliferation," and as the Report points out, both
were involved in the Standard Oil litigation."3 9 One, a manufacturer
sells to retailers and also sells to wholesalers. The act can be avoided
if the manufacturer arbitrarily charges the same price to both classes,
thus committing economic discrimination, but not "price discrimination." But he grants a discount to the wholesalers, recognizing their
status and compensating them for the special distribution functions
which they perform. One of the more efficient wholesalers resells to
retailers at a price lower than that charged by the manufacturer in his
direct sales to other retailers. Slavish application of the act's "effect"
language can accord to this situation the result of illegality, and when
this occurs, the only seeming remedy is for the manufacturer to cut
off one of the two classes or else to control the wholesalers' resale prices
in direct contravention of other antitrust policy. The Report quite
naturally denounces this approach and calls for a rule absolving the
138. REPoRT at 204.

139. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951), reversing, 173 F.2d 210
(7th Cir. 1949). For the extensive history of this case before the Commission and
the courts, see REPoRT at 205 n.243.

1955l

ANTITRUST POLICY IN DISTRIBUTION

seller from any responsibility for his buyer's resale prices. Whether
or not it is possible to achieve this result under existing statutory language, however, is a very real question.' 40
The second problem is even more critical. A seller who sells
only to wholesalers is in a relatively safe position. But many retailers,
chains and others, have taken on full wholesaling functions by investing capital in warehousing, delivery and other facilities for performing
intermediate functions. Some resell only at retail and others resell
at both wholesale and retail. Retail sales of both may be in competition with retailers who are non-integrated and who purchase entirely
from independent wholesalers. Economically it would seem that the
integrated buyer should be entitled to seek a return for the service
which he renders, and of necessity he must seek at least reimbursment
for the extra costs of which he relieves the seller. However, if the
seller accords to such a buyer a functional discount, he runs the immediate risk of being met with the charge that he is injuring competition on the retail level, especially if the integrated buyer's overall efficiency results in lower resale prices than are charged by the other
buyers. Even without apparent reflection of the discount in lower
resale prices, the discount may still possibly be attacked on the theory
that it enhances the integrated buyer's profits or in some other way contributes to his competitive strength. Mindful of the act's anti-chain
store parentage, the Commission, up to the time of release of the Report,
had ignored the wholesale functions performed by the integrated buyer
and had insisted that the character of his reselling as a retailer be determinative. 41 In other words, on such goods as the buyer sold at
retail, he was to pay the same price as that paid by his retail competitors
who dealt with independent wholesalers, irrespective of the fact that the
buyer may have performed true wholesaling functions in the purchase
and handling of the goods.
There are only three ways to deal with this problem. One is to
hold to the status quo and continue this uneconomic penalization of
integration, thus using the law to attempt to stratify distribution along
the lines of the nineteenth century. A second is to decide that neither
good conscience nor the requirements of economic progress can permit
us indefinitely to hold to such a legal policy and that the act must be
repealed. A third is to seek some compromise.
140. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes discrimination illegal "where
. may be . . . to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any
person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination,
or with cutowners of either of them." 49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1952). (Emphasis added.)
141. REPoRT at 205 nn241-43.
the effect . .
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The Report had to seek compromise and it made as powerful
an argument for an intermediate position as could be made. Deploring the thwarting of efficiency and the affirmative discrimination in a
rule compelling integrated distributors to furnish wholesaling functions
free of charge, it called for abandonment of the inflexible position of the
Commission and for adoption of an approach which would permit
cc...
due recognition and reimbursement for actual marketing functions.

.

.

. [A] distributor should be eligible for a discount cor-

responding to any part of the function he actually performs on that
part of the goods for which he performs it." 'It is important to note the legal theory offered by the Report
in support of this principle. This is that where "injury" on the retail
level comes from the integrated buyer's lower resale prices on the
merchandise, this sort of injury, as a matter of law, must not be regarded as the "effect" of the seller's discount; it is instead the result
of the buyer's own independent decision. As with the first problem
discussed above, the seller should have no responsibility for the buyer's
resale price, so long at least as the seller has in good faith sold to that
[T]he law should
buyer as a wholesaler and not as a retailer (".
tolerate no subterfuge").'3

This approach would go far to introduce flexibility into the act's
application to sales to integrated buyers. Absolving the seller of responsibility for effects created by the buyer's resale price-cutting would
permit true functional differentiation, and the seller's chief concern
would be to treat all those performing wholesale functions equally and
to make sure that he was not in reality giving a wholesale discount to
one performing only retail functions. The difficulty with the theory is
that it rests on a legal foundation whose support in the language of the
act is debatable.' 44
A partial victory has apparently been scored by the Report in this
connection. In its recent Doubleday decision,' 45 the Commission has
142. Id. at 207-09.
143. Id. at 208.
144. See note 140 supra.
145. Doubleday & Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 5897 (Aug. 31, 1955) (mimeo.). Count IV
of the case involved price discrimination, and the respondent attempted to justify certain discounts to three large wholesalers, one of whom also operated retail stores, on the
ground that the discounts were only compensation for extra distributive functions
performed. The hearing examiner ruled that this theory was legally invalid and
excluded the proffered evidence, although the evidence was in the record. The
opinion of the Commission, per Chairman Howrey, ruled that the evidence should have
been admitted but that no prejudicial error was committed because on its face the
evidence was insufficient to substantiate respondent's theory.
It is not entirely clear how many Commissioners agreed with Chairman Howrey.
Commissioners Secrest and Mead expressly disagreed, though concurring in the result. Commissioner Mason expressly agreed with Chairman Howrey, dissenting on
another part of the opinion. Commissioner Gwynne, however, was recorded simply
as concurring "in the result."
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rendered an opinion which, borrowing heavily from the language of
the Report, reverses the long-standing refusal of the Commission to
look at other than the character of the buyer's selling activities and announces that wholesaling functions of an integrated buyer are entitled
to discount recognition.
The Doubleday opinion does not state the legal theory on which it
is based, and notably does not expressly rest itself upon the Report's
theory that legally the seller should have no responsibility for the buyer's
resale prices. The relatively narrow formula stated is that the "amount
of the discount should be reasonably related to the expenses assumed
by the buyer. It should not exceed the cost of that part of the function
he actually performs on that part of the goods for which he performs
it." 146 If the discount must be no greater than the buyer's wholesaling
costs, thus apparently precluding the buyer from a profit on this part
of his investment, it would seem that the Commission has not adopted
the Report's legal theory. Rather, although this is not stated, it
would appear that the Commission's theory is that the seller remains
responsible for effects on the buyer's resale level of competition, but
that a discount which only returns the buyer's extra costs cannot
injure competition on that level for the discount will be eaten up by costs
not incurred by the competitors who do not receive the discount. This
theory would seem to be entirely compatible with the act's language.
The Commission has thus taken a step in the right direction but
perhaps has not gone the distance. The result is a contribution, but
apparently the integrated buyer must continue to be content with something less than full reward for the functions he performs, unless subsequent clarification of the Doubleday opinion unfolds a different theory.
The widespread hostility to large buyers, of course, means that
both the Report's theory and the lesser Doubleday theory will meet determined opposition from those to whom the act is not supposed to be
an invitation to market analysis but rather a program for reducing
distribution to its simplest common denominators.

The Distribution Chapter is not a fully comprehensive manifesto
for a new birth of distribution freedom. But it makes many suggestions which should be carefully considered, and it certainly provides
the occasion and the stimulus for an intensified reappraisal of our
complex and perplexing distribution laws. There is nothing else like
it available.
146. Id. at p. 5 (mimeo.).

